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Abstract
We analyze the innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with imper-
fect private monitoring. The ecient outome can be approximated in
any prisoners' dilemma game, while every individually rational feasi-
ble payo can be approximated in a class of prisoner dilemma games.
Our results require that monitoring be suciently accurate but do not
require very low discounting.
1 Introduction
We analyze the innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect private
monitoring and discounting. The main contribution of this paper is to con-
struct \belief-based" strategies, where a player's continuation strategy is a
function only of his beliefs. This simplies the analysis considerably, and
allows us to explicitly construct sequential equilibria for such games, thus
I am grateful to Michihiro Kandori for many discussions on this topic, and to the
University of Tokyo for its hospitality while this paper was written.
1enabling us to invoke the one-step deviation principle of dynamic program-
ming. By doing so, we prove that one can approximate the ecient payo
in any prisoners' dilemma game provided that the monitoring is suciently
accurate. Furthermore, for a class of prisoners' dilemma games, one can ap-
proximate every individually rational feasible payo. These results require
that monitoring be suciently accurate, but only require a uniform lower
bound on the discount rate.
These results are closely related to an important paper by Sekiguchi [10],
who shows that one can approximate the ecient payo in such games pro-
vided that the monitoring is suciently accurate. Sekiguchi's result applies
for a class of prisoners' dilemma payos, and relied on the construction of
a Nash equilibrium which achieves approximate eciency. Standard argu-
ments can then be invoked to show that there exists a sequential equilibrium
with the same outcome. However, in order to show that a strategy prole
is a Nash equilibrium, Sekiguchi has to invoke a path dominance argument,
which requires the payo restrictions imposed. The explicit construction of
sequential equilibrium shows that one does not require such a payo restric-
tion.
2 Approximating the Ecient Payo
C D
C 1  l
D 1 + g 0
We consider the prisoners' dilemma with the stage game payos given
above, where the row indicates the player's own action and the column indi-
cates his opponent's action. Players only observe their own actions, and also
observe a private signal which is informative about their opponent's action.
This signal belongs to the set 
 = fc;dg; where c (resp. d) is more likely
when the opponent plays C (resp. D). The signalling structure is assumed
symmetric, in the sense that the probability of errors does not depend on the
action prole played. Given any action prole a = (a1;a2); ai 2 A = fC;Dg;
the probability that exactly one player receives a wrong signal is " > 0, and
the probability that both receive wrong signals is  > 0: Players maximize
the expected sum of stage game payos discounted at rate : We also assume
that at the end of each period, players observe the realization of a public
randomization device uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
2Our approach is closely related to Sekiguchi's [10]: we show that one
can construct a mixed trigger strategy sequential equilibrium which achieves
partial cooperation. With public randomization, one can modify this appro-
priately in order to approximate full cooperation. Our approach involves the
construction of a \belief-based" strategy, i.e. a strategy which is a function of
the player's beliefs about his opponent's continuation strategy. This results
in a major simplication as compared to the more conventional notion of a
strategy which is a function of the private information of the player.
We begin by dening partial continuation strategies. In any period t;
dene the partial continuation strategy D as follows: play D at period t;
and at period t + 1 play D if the realized outcomes in period t are (Dc) or
(Dd): Dene the partial continuation strategy C as follows: in any period
t play C; at period t + 1 play C if the realized outcomes in period t is
(Cc); and play D if the realized outcome at t is (Cd): We call C and D
a partial continuation strategy since each of these fully species the player's
actions in every subsequent period at every information set that arises given
that he conrms to the strategy: In consequence, the (random) path and
payos induced by any pair of partial continuation strategies is well dened.
However, a partial continuation strategy does not specify the player's actions
in the event that he deviates from the strategy at some information set.
This is deliberate, since our purpose is to construct the full strategies that
constitute a sequential equilibrium. Note also that for any player i; only
the partial continuation strategy of player j is relevant when computing i's
payos in any equilibrium.
Let Vab(;";); a;b 2 fC;Dg denote the repeated game payo of a
against b | these payos are well dened since the path induced by each
pair is well dened. We have that VDD > VCD; for all parameter values.
Furthermore, if  >
g
1+g; and (" + ) is suciently small, then VCC > VDC:
Suppose that player i believes that his opponent is playing either C or D;
and is playing C with probability : Then the dierence between his payo
from playing C and his payo from playing D is given by
V (;;";) = (VCC   VDC)   (1   )(VDD   VCD) (1)
Hence V () is increasing and linear in  and there is a unique value,
p(;";); at which it is zero. Suppose now that at t = 1 both players are
restricted to choosing between C and D : There is a mixed equilibrium of
the restricted game, where each player plays the strategy  which plays D
3with probability 1 p and C with probability p: Note that p(;";) increases
to 1 as we decrease  towards its lower bound
g
1+g: Let  be such that p > 1
2:
For future reference we emphasize that equation (1) applies to any period
| if a player believes that his opponent's continuation strategy is C with
probability  and D with probability 1   ; then he prefers C to D if
 > p and prefers D to C if  < p: Note also that if a player's opponent
begins at t = 1 with a strategy in fC;Dg; his continuation strategy also
belongs to this set, since D induces only D; while C may induce either C
or D; depending upon the private history that the opponent has observed.
We dene the following four belief revision operators. Starting with any
initial belief ; we can dene the player's new beliefs when he takes action a
and receives signal !: His new belief (i.e. the probability that j's continuation
strategy is C) will be given by a!(): We have four belief operators, Cc;
Cd; Dc; Dd; where each a! : [0;1] ! [0;1] is dened, using Bayes rule, as
follows
Cc() =
(1   2"   )]












(" + ) + (1   "   )(1   )
(5)
Starting with any initial belief ^  at the beginning of the game, a player's
belief at any private history, i.e. after an arbitrary sequence (a!)t
r=1; can
be computed by iterated application of the appropriate belief operators. Let
(^ ) be the set of possible beliefs, i.e.  2 (^ ) , 9 < r >t
r=1: 1 = ^ ,
t =  and r+1 = (a!)r(r);(a!)r 2 A  
;1  r  t   1: Let  be a (full)
strategy, which is dened at every information set, i.e. after arbitrary private
histories. Clearly,  is a best response to  after every private history if and
only if it is optimal to play  at every belief  2 (p); i.e. at all possible
beliefs given the initial belief p:
We now examine the properties of these belief operators. First, each
is a strictly increasing function:1 Fig. 1 graphs the rst two belief opera-
1The derivative is strictly positive since the derivative of the numerator is strictly
positive while the derivative of the denominator is zero for every a!:
4tors, Cc and Cd; which play a particularly important role in the analysis.
The operator Cc has an interior xed point at ; and Cc() 7  as
 ?  (cf. Fig. 1). The value of  depends upon (";) in the following way
(";) =
1   3"   2
1   2"   2
(6)
We shall assume that maxf";g < 1   "   ; which in turn entails that
5 > 1
2:
We claim that the graph of each of the other three operators (Cd;Dc;Dd)
lies below the 450 line on Fig 1, provided that maxf";g < 1   "   : To
verify this, take any typical expression from 3-5, and divide by : This yields
" (or ) in the numerator, while the denominator is strictly larger since it is
a convex combination of (" + ) and (1   "   ): Hence a!() <  for each
of these three operators.
Since  <  ) a!() <  for any belief operator, this immediately
implies that if p < ; (p)  [0;): This follows from the fact that the initial
belief p is strictly less than ; and since we have demonstrated that no point
0 >  is the image of any    under any belief operator.
Hence, provided that initial beliefs are given by p < ; it suces to
dene our belief based strategy for beliefs in the set [0;]: Let  : [0;] !
fC;D;g be dened as follows: () = C if  2 (p;] and () = D if
 2 [0;p): If  = p;() = ; i.e.  plays C with probability p and D with
probability 1   p: Hence the pair (;p), i.e.  in conjunction with an initial
belief p, species a strategy at every possible belief.
The advantage of this specication is that a player's continuation strategy
is specied even at information sets which arise due to a player's deviating
from  in the past. However, the denition of  is potentially problematic,
in the sense that it may be inconsistent, i.e. for example, at some ; ()
could prescribe C; but (Cc()) could prescribe D: We now show that this
problem does not arise.
Denition 1 (; ^ ) is consistent if and only if 8 2 (^ );() 2 fC;g )
[(Cc()) = C and (Cd()) = D] and () 2 fD;g ) [(Dc()) =
D and (Dd()) = D].
Lemma 2 If 1
2 < p < (";); (;p) is consistent.
Proof. To establish that (;p) is consistent we need to verify the following:
1.  2 [p;] ) Cc() > p:
2. 2 [p;] ) Cd() < p.
3.   p ) Dc() < p:
4.   p ) Dd() < p
To verify 1, recall that Cc() >  if  < ; so that k
Cc(p) > p for any k:
3 and 4 follow from the fact already established that Dc and Dd lie below
the 450 line, and the fact that these are increasing functions. To verify 2, it
suces to verify that Cd()  p, since Cd is strictly increasing:
6Cd() =
"(1   3"   2)












2;) | this follows from the fact that p(;";) ! 1 as  !
g
1+g
and (" + ) ! 0; while p(;";) ! 0 if  ! 1 and (" + ) ! 0: Henceforth
we shall assume that  is such that p 2 (1
2;) so that (;p) is consistent.
We have therefore established that the pair (;p) denes a full strategy
which is behaviorally equivalent to :
Proposition 3 If 1
2 < p < (";);the strategy prole where each player plays
(;p) is a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. Note rst that if  = p; a player is indierent between playing C and
D; and hence a one-step deviation from playing  is not protable. Since
the payos from playing ;C and D are equal at belief p; one may also,
for the purposes of computing payos, use C or D as is computationally
convenient in the event of belief p:
Consider rst the case when  > p: A one-step deviation from  is to play
D; and to continue with  in the next period. The following sub-cases arise:
a) Suppose that Dc()  p and Dd()  p: In this case, a one-step
deviation from  is to play D; whereas () = C: However, (1) establishes
that in this case C is preferable to D; and hence a one-step deviation from
 is unprotable.
b) Suppose that Dc()  p and Dd() > p, so that the one-step devia-
tion is play D today and continue with D if Dc is reached, and to continue
with C if Dd is reached. Let ~ V () be payo dierence between the equilib-
rium strategy and the one-step deviation.. Note that the one step deviation
diers from D only at the information set Dd; at this information it contin-
ues by playing C whereas D continues with D: Hence we can write ~ V ()
as the payo dierence between C and D minus the payo dierence be-
tween C and D conditional on Dd being reached, as follows:
~ V () = V ()   [(" + ) + (1   )(1   "   )][V (Dd())] (8)
Note that Dd() < : Equation (1) shows that this implies that V () >
V (Dd()): Since the coecient multiplying V (Dd()) is strictly less
7than one, this implies that ~ V () > 0: Hence if  > p; a one-step deviation
is unprotable.
c) Finally, we establish that Dc() < p 8   ; so that no other sub-case
need be considered. Evaluating Dc at the upper bound ; we have
Dc() =
"(1   3"   2)





Consider now the case when  < p: In this case, a one-step deviation
from  is to play C today, and to continue with C if Cc()  p; but to
continue with D if Cc() < p: (Note that  < p ) Cd() < p; so the
continuation strategies do not dier in this event.) In the rst sub-case, the
one-step deviation from  corresponds to playing C, and (1) establishes that
in this case D is preferable to C; and hence a one-step deviation from 
is unprotable. In the second sub-case, the one-step deviation diers from
C only at the information set Cc | it plays D at this information set
rather than C: Let ^ V () denote the payo dierence between the one-
step deviation and the equilibrium strategy D: We have
^ V () = V ()   [(1   "   ) + (1   )(" + )][V (Cc())] (10)
Since p > Cc() > ;V () < V (Cc()) < 0: Also, the coecient
multiplying V (Cc()) is less than 1 which establishes that ^ V () > 0:
We have therefore established that if a player's opponent j plays the
strategy  (which randomizes between C and D); it is optimal for player i
to play ; with initial belief p: However, (;p) is consistent and behaviorally
equivalent to the strategy : Hence the prole where both players play (;p)
is a sequential equilibrium.
It may be of interest to ask, under what conditions is there a pure strategy
sequential equilibrium where both players begin in period one by playing C
with probability one. The above analysis also permits an answer to this
question, with the dierence that the initial belief ^  = 1 rather than p: Only
consistency conditions 1 and 2 are aected, and must be modied as follows:
1'.k
Cc(1) > p8k.
2'. = 1 or  = k
Cc(1) for any k ) Cd() < p.
Clearly, 1' is always satised as long as p  : However, for 2' to be




 p <  (11)
8In Fig. 1, this requires that the Cd function always lies below ; which
requires the inequality
"
2 < (1   3"   2) (12)
This inequality will be satised if " is suciently small relative to ;
i.e. if signals are suciently positively correlated. It is easily veried that
this inequality cannot be satised if signals are independent or negatively
correlated so that the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
Note that p plays a dual role in the construction of the mixed strategy
equilibrium. On the one hand it is the randomization probability in the
rst period, and on the other hand, it is simply a number which denes
the threshold at which behavior changes. These roles are obviously distinct,
as is apparent from our discussion of the pure strategy equilibrium. This
distinction is particularly relevant when we discuss the folk theorem in the
following section.
With the construction of the mixed equilibrium, it is easy to show that
one can use public randomization to approximate full cooperation.
Lemma 4 If (v1;v2) is a sequential equilibrium payo for some  2 (0;1); it
is also an equilibrium payo for any 
0 >  if a public randomization device
is availablee.
Proof. Let  be the strategy prole giving the required payo given : Given

0; let m = 
0. Players play a sequence of games: they begin with the strategy
prole : If the sunspot in any period  > m; they play a new game and
re-start with :
Proposition 5 If  >
g
1+g, any payo x < 1 is a symmetric equilibrium
payo if " and  are suciently small.
Proof. For any (";) select (";) so that 1
2 < p < (";): We have veried
that under these conditions  is a sequential equilibrium. Let (";) ! (0;0)
and (";) !
g
(1+g); so that p ! 1: The equilibrium payo tends to one.
Lemma 4 ensures that this result holds for all  >
g
1+g:
Note that in order to approximate the payo (1;1); we require that the
noise vanishes but do not require that discounting vanishes. In this sense
the result proved here is stronger than that proved in Piccione [9], who re-
quires that both discounting and the noise vanish in order to approximate
the ecient payo.
9The equilibrium we have constructed is a very robust one. Equilibria in
repeated games with imperfect monitoring are usually robust to renements
involving strategy perturbations. Since the monitoring structure has full
support, a deviation by player i from his equilibrium strategy cannot be ob-
served by the other player.2 However, equilibria which have been constructed
for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring are often not robust if
there is a small amount of incomplete information about each player's pay-
os, as in Harsanyi [6]. This issue is discussed in greater detail in Bhaskar [1],
who proposes a renement for repeated game equilibria based on robustness
to payo perturbations.3 This renement requires the following condition:
consider two information sets for a player at date t;h and h0; and where the
player's continuation strategy is  at h and 0 at h0. If it is also optimal
for the player to play  at h0 and 0 at h; then the equilibrium is robust
only if  = 0: To verify that the equilibrium (;p) is robust, note that a
player is indierent between his continuation strategies only at the belief
 = p; and at any information set where this belief arises, he always plays
the same strategy : This robustness also applies to the private monitoring
equilibria constructed by several others including Bhaskar and van Damme
[3] Mailath and Morris [8], and Sekiguchi [10]. The equilibria constructed in
these papers have the common feature that a player's beliefs (regarding his
opponent's future behavior) vary with his private information, and his con-
tinuation strategy also varies with his beliefs. This contrasts with a dierent
approach to constructing equilibria, where a player plays dierent continua-
tion strategies  at h and 0 at h0 and is indierent between the two strategies
at both these information sets. This is the approach taken in Piccione [9],
and also by Compte [4] and Kandori and Matsushima [7] in their analysis
of private monitoring with independent signals.4 Piccione uses a strategy
whereby a player is made indierent between playing C and D at each pe-
riod in which he is supposed to play C; and plays C when he observes a
good signal and D when he observes a bad signal. These equilibria are not
robust to payo perturbations since players will ignore their payo irrelevant
information and only condition upon their payo information.
2See Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [5], p1025, for a discussion.
3See also [2] for a specic application of this renement.
4The equilibria constructed by Compte and Kandori-Matsushima are robust in the
case where signals are correlated; however, their two-player folk theorem results require
independent signals.
103 Approximating Any Individually Rational
Feasible Payo
We now build on the construction of the previous section and show how
to approximate any individually rational feasible payo. The key to doing
this is to approximate the payo (
1+g+l
1+l ;0), which is player 1's maximal
payo within the set of individually rational and feasible payos in the usual
prisoners' dilemma, where (C;C) is the symmetric ecient payo. Since
the payo (1;1) has already been approximated in the previous section, one
can then use public randomization to approximate any individually rational
feasible payo.
It might be useful to outline the basic construction and to explain the
complications that arise. The basic idea of our construction is that play be-
gins in the asymmetric phase where player 1 plays D and player 2 randomizes,
playing C with a high probability, q2. This asymmetric phase continues or
ends, depending upon the realization of a public randomization device. Thus
player 1's per-period payo in the asymmetric phase is approximately 1 + g
while player 2's per-period payo is approximately  l: Since the latter is less
than the individually rational payo for player 2, he must be rewarded for
playing C: To ensure this, when the asymmetric phase ends, both player's
continuation strategies depend upon their private information. Player 1 con-
tinues with C if he has observed the signal c in the last period (i.e. if his
information is Dc)and continues with D if he has observed d (i.e. if his
information is Dd): This ensures that player 2 is rewarded for playing C in
the asymmetric phase. Similarly, player 2 continues with C if his private
information is Cd; the information set which is most likely when he plays
C;and continues with D if his private information is Dd: Hence, if the noise
is small, player 2's continuation payo when the asymmetric phase ends is
approximately 1 if he has played C in the previous period and approximately
zero if he has played D: Hence if  is large relative to l ( > l
1+l); we can,
by choosing the value of the sunspot appropriately, make player 2 indierent
between C and D in the asymmetric phase. The payos in this equilibrium
converge to (
1+g+l
1+l ;0) as the noise vanishes.
However, one must also verify that the players nd it optimal to play
C and D, as appropriate, at each information set after the end of the
asymmetric phase. A complication arises here, as compared to the previous
section, since player 1 does not randomize in the asymmetric phase, i.e. he
11plays D for sure. (Indeed, he cannot play C with positive probability, since
in that case his payo in the asymmetric phase is bounded above by 1 and
hence cannot approximate 1 + g):5 Hence when player 2 receives the signal
c; he knows that there has been at least one error in signals, and his beliefs
about player 1's continuation strategy depend upon the relative probability
of one (") versus two errors (). In other words, his continuation strategy at
the information sets Cc and Dc depends upon the correlation structure of
signals. Since player 2's continuation strategy depends upon this correlation
structure, this implies that player 1's beliefs also depend upon the correlation
structure.
We adopt two alternative approaches to handle this problem. First, we
show that if signals are positively correlated, so that the probability of two
errors is at least as large as the probability of one error, then one can approx-
imate the asymmetric payo, without any restriction upon payos. Second,
we show that one does not need such positive correlation of signals provided
that one can choose  so that p(;";) suciently close to one. This result
applies to any prisoners' dilemma game where g  l | in any such game
one can approximate the asymmetric payo arbitrarily closely. However, this
second approach does not work if l > g, since in this case one cannot have
p(;";) ! 1: The reason for this is the for p to be close to 1, we must have
 !
g
1+g: However, in the asymmetric phase, player 2 incurs a loss of l by
playing C; whereas his continuation payo gain is no more than 1: Hence
player 2 will be willing to play C in the asymmetric phase only if  > l
1+l:
Hence if l > g, one cannot have p close to 1 since  is bounded away from
g
1+g:
We make the following assumption for this section:
Assumption A Either A1:   " or A2: g  l and (1 )(1 2" ) >
"3:
Note that A1 is a relatively strong assumption that signals are positively
correlated, but does not require any assumption on payos. On the other
hand, A2 requires an assumption on payos but is a mild assumption about
the relative probability of errors. It is always satised if signals are positively
correlated, or independent. In the independent signal case, the left hand side
is a term of order ("+)2 whereas the right hand side is a term of order ("+)3:
5This argument is more general and implies that one cannot have a folk theorem in com-
pletely mixed strategies in any repeated game. Let ^ v1 be the supremum payo of player 1 in
any equilibrium where player 1 randomizes in every period at every information set. Since
^ v1  (1   )mina1fmaxa2 u1(a1;a2)g + ^ v1; this implies ^ v1  mina1fmaxa2 u1(a1;a2)g:
12Hence A2 is satised even if signals are negatively correlated provided that
they are not too highly so.
We now dene the players' strategies more precisely. In any period t   1
in the asymmetric phase, player 1 plays D for sure, while player 2 randomizes
between C and D; choosing C with a constant probability q2 which is close
to 1. At the end of period, players observe the realization, t 1, of a sunspot
which is uniformly distributed on [0;1]: If t 1 > 1 ; both players continue
in the asymmetric phase for the next period. If t 1  ; the asymmetric
phase ends for both players, and is never reached again. In this case, each
player's continuation strategy (i.e. his state) depends upon the realization
of his private information, at date t   1: (i.e. players ignore their private
information from previous dates). Let t 1 denote the player's private infor-
mation realization at date t   1: Player 1 continues with C if t 1 = Dc; if
t 1 = Dd; he continues in period t with D:6 Player 2's continues with C if
t 1 = Cd; and continues with D if t 1 = Dd: If t 1 2 fCc; Dcg; player 2
continues with C if 2(t 1) > p(;";) and with D if 2(t 1)  p(;";):
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we show that player 2 is willing to
randomize in the asymmetric phase provided that  is appropriately chosen,
and that the payos associated with this class of equilibria tend to (
1+g+l
1+l ;0)
as the noise vanishes. Subsequently, we shall demonstrate that all players
are choosing optimally at every information set.
Write W2(D) for the payo of player 2 in the asymmetric phase given
that he plays D; and W2(C) for the payo in the asymmetric phase from
playing C. Since W2(D) = W2(C) = W2; we have
W2(D) = (1   )W2 + V2(D) (13)
where V2(D) is the expected payo to player 2 conditional on the fact
that the asymmetric phase has ended and that he has played D: Similarly,
letting V2(C) be the expected payo to 2 conditional on the fact that the
asymmetric phase has ended and that he has played C; we have
W2(C) = (1   )( l) + (1   )W2 + V2(C) (14)
6We show that any strategy which plays C in the asymmetric phase is dominated,
and hence we need not dene precisely the optimal continuation strategy after playing C:
The existence of an optimal continuation strategy follows from the same argument as in
Sekiguchi [10]. Since player 1 never plays C in the asymmetric phase; his continuation
after his own deviation does not aect player 2's incentives:
13Clearly, V2(D) ! 0 as (";) ! (0;0): We now show that V2(C) ! 1 as
(";) ! (0;0):Let V2(Cd) (resp. V2(Cc)) denote the continuation payo at
the end of the asymmetric phase, conditional on Cd (resp. Cc): Since player
1 plays D for sure in the asymmetric phase, we have
V2(C) = (1   "   )V2(Cd) + (" + )V2(Cc) (15)
Hence it suces to establish that V2(Cd) ! 1 as (";) ! (0;0):Write
2(Cd) for the probability that player 1's continuation strategy is C; given
that t 1 = Cd: Since 2(Cd) 
1 2" 
1 "  ;2(Cd) ! 1 as " ! 0: Hence from
equation (1) V2(Cd) ! VCC; where VCC ! 1 as (";) ! (0;0):
Hence if " +  is suciently small and  > l
1+l; there exists a value of 
which equates W2(C) and W2(D). Further, as (" + ) ! 0;  !
(1 )l
 ; and
player 2's payo converges to zero:
If q2 ! 1; player 1's per-period payo tends to (1+g) in the asymmetric
phase, and 1 in the cooperative phase. By substituting for the limiting value
of  which is
(1 )l
 ; we see that player 1's payo converges to
1+g+l
1+l : (We shall
establish later that q2 ! 1):
We now verify that each player plays optimally at each information set
in this equilibrium. In the asymmetric phase, this is so for player 2 by
construction, since he is indierent between C and D: It is easy to see that
player 1 also plays optimally in the asymmetric phase, since he is choosing
his one shot best response.7
Consider now the transition to the cooperative phase, i.e. the player's ac-
tions in the rst period after the sunspot signals the end of the asymmetric
phase. Since each player only conditions on his private information in the
previous period, we may focus on this alone. Player 1 has two possible infor-
mation sets, (Dc) and (Dd); whereas player 2 has four possible information
sets. Let i() denote the probability assigned by player i to his opponent's
continuation strategy being C; given that i is at information set :
We shall assume that parameters are such that "+ < 1




1 "  ): It is easily veried that this assumption on p does not imply any
7It is possible that playing C in the asymmetric phase increases player 1's continuation
payo in the cooperative phase. However, it is easy to see that such an increase can
never oset the loss from playing C: A simple proof is as follows. If playing C in the
asymmetric phase is optimal for 1, then playing C in every period in the asymmetric
phase is also optimal. The overall payo of this strategy is approximately 1 if the noise
is small, whereas the payo of player 1 in the equilibrium tends to
1+g+l
1+l ; which is strictly
greater.
14restrictions upon g or l: However, if we invoke assumption A2, then we may
also choose p to be arbitrarily close to its upper bound. We shall also assume




"(1 " ) g: Note that
 > ; and hence q2 < : Also  ! 1 as (";) ! (0;0) and hence we can also
have q2 ! 1:
Consider rst the beliefs of player 2: Let 2(:) denote the probability
assigned by 2 to the event that 1's continuation strategy is C: Since 1 plays
C at Dc and D at Dd; and since 1 does not play C in the asymmetric
phase, we have
2(Cd) =
1   2"   
1   "   
(16)
Since we have assumed that p <
1 2" 
1 "  ; it is optimal to continue with C
today. Further, we have
Cd(2(Cd)) =
(1   2"   )"





Hence it is optimal for 2 to switch to the defection phase if he receives
the signal Cd at any date in the future.
At Dd; we have
2(Dd) =
"
1   "   
(18)
This is clearly less than p if (" + ) < 1
3; so that it is optimal to continue
with D:
Consider now the beliefs of player 2 at (Cc) and (Dc); i.e. at the in-










Recall that 2 plays D at least at one of these information sets, since the
above probabilities cannot be both greater than p; since this is greater than
one-half. Hence there are three possibilities: either both 2(Dc) and 2(Cc)
are less than p; or exactly one of these is greater than p: Now if 2(:) < p at
15any information set, it is optimal to continue with D today, and at every
future date. Hence it remains to verify the case when 2(:)  p:
Suppose that

+" > p; so that 2 plays C at Dc: If

+"  ; lemma 1
veries that it is optimal to continue with C in this case. Hence consider
the case where

+" > : We have that  >  ) Cc() < : Further, since
Cd is an increasing function, it suces to verify that Cd(

+") < p; since
this implies that Cd() < p for  = k
Cc(







(" + ) + "(1   "   )
(21)
This is less than 1
2 if " + is less than 1
3: Hence player 2's continuation
strategy is optimal is optimal at Dc:
Finally, we consider the case where that 2 plays C at Cc; i.e. when
"
"+ > p: Note that in this case A1 is violated. Hence we assume A2, which
ensures that we can make p arbitrarily close to its upper bound
1 2" 
1 "  ,
by selecting  suciently close to
g
1+g: We can nd a value of p such that
Cd( "
"+) < p provided that Cd( "






"2 +    
2 <
1   2"   
1   "   
(22)
It is easily veried that the inequality above is ensured by condition A2.
Consider now the beliefs of player 1: His beliefs will depend upon player
2's strategy, which in turn depends upon the parameters of the signal distri-
bution, and as we have seen, there are three possible cases.
Consider rst the case where 2 plays C only at information set Cd:
1(Dc) =
q2(1   2"   )
q2(1   "   ) + (1   q2)(" + )
(23)
Note that the expression is such that 1(Dc) = Cc(q2), where Cc is
the belief revision operator dened in the previous section. Hence it follows
that if q2 2 [ p(;";);); it follows that k
Cc(q2) 2 (p;); 8k; and hence it is
optimal for player 1 to continue with C at every information set.
Consider 1's beliefs at (Dd): Once again, it is easy to verify that 1(Dd) =
Cd(q2); and since q2 < ; it is optimal to continue with D at this information
set.
16Consider next the case where 2(Cd) = 2(Cc) = C and 2(Dd) =
2(Dc) = D: In this case, assumption A2 applies, so that we may choose p
close to its upper bound. We have
1(Dc) =
q2(1   "   )
q2(1   "   ) + (1   q2)(" + )
(24)
If q2 > p; then 1(Dc) > p so that it is optimal to start by playing C
in this case. To see that player 1 will nd it optimal to switch to D on










Now if 1(Dc)  ; lemma 1 has veried that C is consistent in this case,
i.e. the player will switch to D on receiving signal Cd in any subsequent
period. If 1(Dc) > ; it suces to verify that Cd(1(Dc)) <
1 2" 
1 "  ; which
is the upper bound for p: This yields the condition
q2 <
(" + )(1   2"   )
"(1   "   )
(27)
The right hand side in (27) is precisely one of the arguments used in the
denition of (";); and hence this condition poses no problem.
Finally, we consider the case where 2(Cd) = 2(Dc) = C and 2(Dd) =
2(Cc) = D:
1(Dc) =
q2(1   2"   ) + (1   q)
q2(1   "   ) + (1   q2)(" + )
<
1   2"   
1   "   
(28)
Hence it suces to evaluate Cd at the upper bound, which yields
Cd(
1   2"   
1   "   
) =
(1   2"   )"





Hence Cd(1(Dc)) < 1
2 for every value of q2:
We have therefore proved that the payo (
1+g+l
1+l ;0) (and obviously the
payo (0;
1+g+l




1+lg and provided that " and  are suciently small. The
payo (1;1) has been approximated under a weaker set of assumptions ( >
g
1+g) and " and  suciently small), and the payo (0;0) is a static Nash
payo. Since any payo individually rational feasible payo is a convex
combination of these payos, and can be achieved via public randomization,
we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Assume that A is satised, then for any individually rational
feasible payo vector u = (u1;u2) and any number  > 0, there exist "() >
0;() > 0 such that there exists a sequential equilibrium with payos within




Note that this result does not require vanishing discounting.
4 Concluding Comments
The main point of this paper has been to develop \belief-based" strategies
as a way of constructing sequential equilibria in repeated games with private
monitoring. This aords a major simplication as compared to the tradi-
tional method of analysis. While our construction has been restricted to
the prisoners' dilemma, and to a strategy prole which consists only of two
continuation strategies, the idea underlying this simplication is obviously
generalizable.
Our substantive results are most closely related to those in a recent pa-
per by Piccione [9], who also analyzes the prisoners' dilemma with imperfect
private monitoring. Our results dier, both in terms of substance and in the
techniques/strategies used. Piccione's substantive results are that full coop-
eration can always be approximated, and further, any individually rational
feasible payo can be approximated in a class of prisoners' dilemma games,
i.e. for games where l  g: These approximations require that both the noise
in monitoring and discounting vanish. Our results do not require vanishing
discounting, and our \folk theorem" condition A, is in a sense, the opposite
of Piccione's condition. As we have already mentioned, the two papers use
very dierent techniques.
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